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I. 
contends that this Court has determined that I. § I 117 is the exclusive source 
of attorney fees in this case, and contends that there are at least 14 cases in which this Court has 
stated that I.C § 12-117 is exclusive. Respondent's Brief, p. 3. What Sanders fails to 
acknowledge is that of the 14 cases she cites (all of which have been previously cited and 
summarized by the Board), not one of those cases involves a breach of employment contract like 
is at issue in this case. Sanders further ignores the numerous cases that allow attorney fees under 
I.C § 12-120(3) where a governmental entity prevails on a breach of contract claim, including 
employment claims. See Clark v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 
988,993 (2000) (allowing attorney fees under I.C § 12-120(3) to the State after prevailing on a 
breach of employment contract claim); Willie v. Bel. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 
302,307 (2002) (allowing attorney fees to a school district Board of Trustees when prevailing on 
a breach of employment contract claim); Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 911, 104 
946, (2004) university entitled to attorney under I.e. § [ 120(3) for 
P.3d 11 (2011 ) 1 ; Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 1 P.3d 
Plaintiff Sanders argues, in a footnote, that Sadid does not support the contention that I. C § 12-120(3) is 
available to the Board, ostensibly because 1. C § 12-117 does not apply to Idaho State 's 
Brief, p. 21 (fn. 5) (citing Horne v, Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 706, 69 PJd 120, 126 (2003». It should be 
noted that Horne was decided in 2003, and § 12-117 was amended in 2010. See 2010 H.B. 421, § 1. As it now reads, 
§ 12-117 applies to "state and "political subdivisions". I. C § 12-117( I). A "political subdivision" means 
"a city, a county or any taxing district", and a "state agency" means "any agency as defined in section 67-5201, 
Idaho Code." I.C § 12-117(4). The definition for state agency in I.C § 67-5201, a statute which aiso has been 
revised since 2003, includes "each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules 
or to determine contested cases." I.e § 67-5201(2). Idaho State University is clearly an entity established statutc, 
see I.e § 33-3001, and is statutorily given the power to "adopt rules and regulations." I.e § 33-3006(1), The Board 
of Trustees ofISU is the State Board of Education. I. C § 33-3003. The State Board of Education certainly fits the 
definition of "Agency" in I. C § 67-5201 (and therefore fits the definition of "statc agency" in I. C § 12-117). 
Therefore, Sander's argument that does not apply to this present case holds little weight. The result in Sa did 
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703,712 (2012), reh'g denied (Mar. 12,2012) (Idaho Department Corrections awarded fees 
under 1. § 1 120(3) for prevailing on contract claim). 
While there are numerous cases holding that 1. e. § 12-117 is exclusive to those entities to 
which it applies, Sanders can cite to no case holding that, as a matter of law, 1. e. § 12-117 is 
exclusive over I.e. § 12-120(3) when there is a breach of contract claim stated in the Complaint. 
There is no case which holds so as a matter of law. Further, as mentioned above, there are also 
numerous cases allowing fees under 1. e. § 12-120(3) to "political subdivisions2" or "state 
agencies}" who prevail on contract claims. In the absence of a case absolutely holding that I. e. § 
12-120(3) is unavailable to the Board, and in light of so many similar cases allowing for attorney 
fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) to entities which prevail on breach of contract claims (and which 
could conceivable fall under the definitions of "state agency" or "political subdivision" in I. e. § 
12-117), the Board contends that Judge Norton abused her discretion by refusing to even 
consider an award of attorney under I.e. § 12-120(3). As discussed in more detail below, 
none of Sanders' Judge Norton or require this court to deny to 
the Board Board requests this Court reverse 
ruling on the matter, "VL'~V;'V attorney fees to Board in both the case 
and in this appeal. 
applies to this case because J) Idaho State University is an entity to which I.e. § 12-117 clearly applies, and 2) this 
Court did not hold in that Ie. § 12-117 was not applicable to Idaho State University. Therefore, to the extent 
fees were awarded to Idaho State University under I.e. § 12-120(3) for prevailing on a breach of contract claim, 
should be awarded to the Board in this case. 
In Willie, the school district constituted a political subdivision as defined by I. e. § 12-117. 
Tn Noak, the State Department of Corrections fits the definition of a "state agency" (sec I. C § 67-520]), as 
it is "an executive department of state government" (see 1. C ~ 20-20 I) with the power to make rules (see I. e. § 20-
209(4). 
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OF 
argues that 1. § § 1 117 and 12-120(3) conflict. 's Brief, pp. 6. 
The essence of her argument is in part that the statutes conflict because they both contain a 
"disclaimer that they will apply unless the law provides otherwise." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. 
Indeed, both statutes contain the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" or "unless otherwise 
provided by statute"; however, in actually reading the statute, it is clear that these phrases do not 
create a conflict. 
Before this court can detelmine whether a conflict occurs, the court should attempt to 
construe the statutes at issue harmoniously. In Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 874 P.2d 545 
(1994), in discussing an apparent conflict between I.e. § 12-120 and I.e. § 5-335, the Supreme 
Court stated 
Because I.e. § 12-120(1) requires a party to specify the maximum amount of 
damages claimed § 5-335 forbids a personal injury plaintiff from 
claiming a specific amount of damages, the two statutes admittedly are difficult to 
reconcile. However, it axiomatic that this Court must assume that whenever 
legislature enacts a it in mind previous statutes relati to 
matter. Com;truction, § 51.02 1. 
or amendment, new prOVIsIon IS 
embodied in prior statutes. 
statutes same subject, although in apparent 
are construed to in harmony if reasonably possible. ; Sampson v. Lavton, 
Idaho 453, 457, 3 883, 885 (1963) 
Cox, 125 Idaho at at As is indicated in Cox, not 
construe statutes to and should attempt to construe statutes harmony. 
There no need to constme I.e. §§ 12-117 and 1 120 such that they conflict. There are 
many reasonable readings of statutes under which they do not For example, 
applicable language of 1. § 1 7 states: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL - 3 
(1) Unless othenvise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political or court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attomey's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.e. § 12-117(1) (emphasis added). The phrase "unless otherwise provided by statute" occurs at 
the beginning of the sentence, indicating that what is to follow only applies if there is no other 
statute providing a different recourse. In this case, the language following "unless otherwise 
provided by statute" would be the applicable attomey fee statute if there is no other available 
(and applicable) source of attomey fees. The language in I.e. § 12-120(3) reads differently. It 
states: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or serviees and in any commercial transaction unless 
othenvise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
I.e. § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). This language generally states that in any contract 
attomey fees are to awarded to party (including political 
are specifically defined to statute's scope). 
specifically limited to certain types of (i.e. contract or commercial transactions), 
a list of those actions to which it The phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" 
the list of categories to which it applies. Therefore, the logical reading of the phrase is that 
"unless otherwise provided by law", attorney fees are available when suing on open accounts, 
accounts stated, notes, bills, negotiable instruments, etc. 
Logically, in the myriad statutes dealing these specific issues, legislature could 
indicate that attorney fees are not to be awarded on such actions and have neglected chosen 
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not to) modify I. § 1 120(3) in order to remove its applicability. For example, the Idaho Wage 
Claim Act allows fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 1. § 45-615(2). Though claims 
for wages under the Wage Claim Act appear to fall within the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3) (as 
failure to pay wages is a breach of an employment or service contract, and thus within the scope 
of § 12-120(3», the Wage Claim Act's specific attorney fee statute could easily be seen to limit 
an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs only (which is different from the general provisions of I. e. 
§ 12-120(3). Similarly, under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (claims under which could 
also conceivably fall under the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3»), attorney fees are awarded to plaintiffs 
if they prevail, but to defendants only if "the plaintiffs action is spurious or brought for 
harassment purposes." I. e. § 48-608(5). Thus, in both of these types of claims which could also 
fall under the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3), the statutes do not automatically provide for attorney 
fees to the prevailing party in the way that I.e. § 12-120(3) does. The "unless otherwise provided 
by law" language included I. § 12-120(3) applies only to the type of claim being litigated, not 
the parties involved. Therefore, almost identical phrases in 1. e. § 1 120(3) and l. e. § 1 
117 not result in a and the statutes can be harmonized 4 
plain of statutes in a conclusion that IS no 
Sanders admits that 1. § 12-120(3) 
applies, by its own parties, including individuals such as 
Appellee Terri Sanders, partnerships, associations and political 
subdivisions. Undoubtedly, by its language ... it would provide a fee 
award to prevailing party [sic J who brought suit against a school district or other 
political subdivision, as well to a school district or political subdivision who 
prevailed against any other of party. 
4 These statutes should not be to conflict "merely because an astute mind can devise more than 
one interpretation" of them. See }vfatter of' Permit No. 36-7200 in Name of Idaho DepL!2LEgrks &Recreation, 121 
Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992), abrogated by Verska v. Saint AI12honsus Reg'! il;{ed. (!.!-'-, 151 Idaho 889, 
265 P .3d 502 (2011). 
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Respondent's Brief, p. 7. In other the Board, as prevailing party, would be entitled to 
attomey fees under I.e. § 1 120(3) if Plaintiff was not trying to limit the applicability of the 
statute to school districts. In fact, the only issue which Plaintiff can point to as a conflict is that 
the standards for awarding attomey fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) and I.e. § 12-117 are different 
(i.e. awards under § 1 120(3) are automatic to the prevailing party, whereas awards under § 1 
117 are allowed only when the non-prevailing party brought or defended the case without basis 
in lawaI' fact). Respondent's Brie}; p. 7. This argument might create an issue if there were a 
source of law stating that both I. e. § § 12-120(3) and 12-117 could not both apply to a single 
case, but Sanders cannot point to such authority. In fact, there is no specific holding in any case 
which makes such a statement. Plaintiff repeatedly points to Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch 
Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17,2010), trying to 
show that that case holds I.e. §§ 1 120(3) and 1 117 arc exclusive and may not both apply to 
the same case. However, Potlatch nothing of the sort Potlatch, and other case 
discussing the of l. § 117 to or other polilical 
holds that § 1 as to r § 1 Idaho at 5, at 
1282. This makes sense UV\.,(LU.)v 1. e. § 1 117 and 1. § 1 121 have the same standard 
determining whether attomey fees are awardable. Because l. e. § 12-120(3) a different 
standard, and applies to of cases, it may apply alongside 1. C § 117. 
e.g., Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County ot Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 415, 258 P.3d 340, 3 
(2011) (no discussion of exclusivity, even though fees were requested under 1. §§ 9-344, 1 
117,12-120(3), and 1 121); Nation v. State, Dept. o[Correction, 144 Idaho 1 194, 158 P.3d 
953, 970 (2007) (no discussion of even though fees were requested under 42 U.s.c. 
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§ 1988, and1.C §§ 12-117, 1 120,12-120(3), and 12-121). 
In other circumstances, I. C § § 1 and 12-117 have been construed 
For example, in Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 216 P.3d 141 
(2009), the City prevailed on summary judgment against a developer on a claim related to 
installation of a water line. Id., 147 Idaho at 853,216 P.3d at 142. With regard to attorney fees, 
the Supreme Court stated 
After judgment was entered in its favor, the City filed a "Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees." In its supporting memorandum, it requested an award of attorney 
fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-120, and 12-121. The district court held 
that the City was the prevailing party, but it denied the City's request for an award 
of attorney fees. In doing so, it addressed Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, but 
it did not consider the applicability ofIdaho Code § 12-120. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides that "in any action where the amount pleaded is 
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to 
the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be 
fixed by the court as attorney's fees." The amount pleaded in this case was less 
than $25,000. 
In its motion for attorney fees, the City 
§ 12--120, and § 1 21, " 
an award pursuant to "§ 1 117, 
its supporting memorandum, it wrote: 
5 § 1 120(1) provides in any ,000.00 , 
be taxed and allowed to as part of the costs 
action, a reasonable amount to fixed by court as attorney's fees." 
There is no requirement under § 12-120 that the Court find the Plaintiff 
pursued the case frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, as set 
forth in Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P. requirement applies only to awards of 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to § 1 121, Idaho Code. The provisions 
of this Section are mandatory .... 
In its memorandum, the City adequately identified Idaho Code § 120(1) as a 
statute under which it was requesting an award of attorney fees. The district court 
denied the City~~ request (or an award of attorney fees without considering the 
applicability of that statute. In doing so, it erred. The City was entitled to an 
That amount is now $35,000, See I.e. § 12-120(1). 
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award of attorney fees under that statute. 
The City requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to [daho Code §§ 
12-117, 12-120(1), and 12-121. Because the City is the prevailing party on 
appeal, it is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(1). 
Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co., 147 Idaho at 856-57, 216 P.3d at 145-46 (emphasis added). 
Though Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. dealt with 1. e. § 12-120( 1) instead of I. e. § 12-120(3), 
that does not alter the applicability of its holding to this case. The City of Preston clearly falls 
within the definition of "political subdivision" of 1. e. § 12-117 (5)(b), and therefore, under 
Sanders' analysis, should only be allowed attorney fees under § 12-117. However, the Supreme 
Court, construing 1. e. §§ 12-120 and 12-117 together, held that it was error for the lower court to 
refuse a request for attorney fees to the City under I.e. § 12-120 when that section applied. To 
apply Sanders' analysis would be to deprive political subdivisions of attorney fees under not only 
1. § 12-120(3), but also subsections (1), (4), (5), and (6) of that statute. Clearly, this is not the 
result intended by the language of the statutes, nor should the Court be eager to read J. e. §§ 1 
1 117 in conflict so as to of any subsection of 1 to ous 
subdivisions. 
second important to be taken from Beckstead case is that if I. § 1 117 
were truly the exclusive source of attorney cities and other political subdivisions 
of the type of claim), then should looked to I.e. § 1 117(5)6 as the 
source for attorney fees in =-=-~==, as opposed to looking at I.e. § 1 120(1).7 I.e. § 12-
At the time Beckstead was handed down, l. C § 12·117(5) and had a limit of instead of $25,000. 
Pursuantto2012IdahoLawsCh.149,1.C § 12-117(5) was renumbered asJ.C § 12-117(6). 
7 If J. C. § 12-117 was tmly exclusive, the Beckstead Court should have stated that while the provisions of 
l. C. § 12-120(1) were met, the provisions of J. C § 12-120(5) were not met, since the amount plead was less than 
$2,500, and should have denied fees under both sections. fnstead, the Court determined that fees were available 
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117(5) then (and now, renumbered as I.e. § 12-117(6) allowed that if the amount plead was less 
than a certain dollar amount 2009, $25,000 now), the person to satisfy both the 
requirements of I. e. § § 12-120 and 1 117 in order to get fees under I. e. § 12-117. However, the 
Beckstead Court did not hold that a person could only get fees under I. e. § 1 117 if a city was a 
party to the lawsuit, and instead allowed the City of Preston to get fees under I. e. § l2-120( I ). 
This would lead to the conclusion that then, as well as now (since the only language which was 
changed under I.e. § 12-117(5) was the dollar amount at question), I.e. §§ 12-117 and 12-120 
were not exclusive of each other when both potentially applied to a case. If the Legislature had 
wanted to correct the Beckstead opinion to make it understood that J. e. § 12-117 was the only 
fee statute allowed when a political subdivision is a party to a case, it had full opportunity to do 
so in both 2010 and 2012 when I.e. § 1 117 was amended. 8 The legislature did not do so. This 
would lead to a conclusion that the Beckstead mling was in line with the Legislature'S 
understanding of both I. e. § § 120 and 12-117, and that where § 12-120 applies, a political 
subdivision (including cities and school may obtain fees under the applicable 
of § 1 
cannot point to a cuse states l. e. § 1 117 is 
over I.e. § 12-120(3) when a school district or board is a party in a contract lawsuit, it makes 
little sense to say that the two statutes conflict. There is no mle that only one fee statute 
apply. In this case, both statutes could have applied. thati. §l 120(3) was not 
an available souree of attorney fees to the Board, abused her discretion, and her 
under § 12-120(1), regardless of compliance with § 12-11 7(5). Therefore, their own terms, § § 12-117 and 12-120 
should be deemed to be both available if the situation merits. 
8 It also had the full 0ppoliuniiy to remove "the stalc of Idaho or political subdivision thereof' ti"om the 
definition of "party" in I. C. § 12-120(3) when that statute was amended in 2012, but did not do so. 
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decision should be reversed. 
Next, Sanders attempts to confuse the Board's explanation of the applicability of I.e. §§ 
12-117 and 12-120 to this case by referring to the "bilateral" or "one-sided" nature of the 
statutes. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 8 - 10. Sanders' explanation makes the situation 
considerably more complex than it needs to be. The Board contends that since there is no case or 
rule expressly holding that only one fee statute can apply to any given case, and because I. e. § § 
12~117 and 12-120 can be construed harmoniously, both can apply to this case. There are many 
cases holding that I. C. § 12-117 applies under certain circumstances (and is exclusive as to other 
general attorney fee statutes, such as [e. § 12-121), and many cases holding that attorney fee 
awards are allowed to political subdivisions under I. e. § 12-120. Under Sanders' interpretation, 
the Court would have to disavow or ovenllie all cases allowing attorney fees to political 
subdivisions under any statute other than 1. e. § 1 1 17. Board's interpretation, no 
IS In a contract case, I.e. § 1 117 and § 12-120(3) can 
is nothing in two statutes causes to so repugnant to 
other must be deemed to conflict. 
where an act covers the entire earlier legislation, is 
in itself, and is evidently intended to the legislation on 
the subject, a later act does not by implication rcpeal an earlier act unless there is 
such a clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, unavoidable, and 
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy that the two acts cannot, by a fair 
and reasonable construction, be reconciled and effect or enforced 
concurrently . 
. . . Nonetheless, a conflict that is merely cosmetic or that relates to anything 
than the operative legal concepts is not enough; there must be a clear repugnancy 
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between the two provisions. 
73 2d Statutes § 278. The alleged between 1. §§ 1 120(3) and I 117 (that 
both contain the "unless otherwise provided by law" language) is not so manifest or controlling 
that this Court need conclude there is an irreconcilable conflict. 
However, to the extent that this Court does determine that there is a conflict, the Board 
contends that 1. e. § 12-120(3) is still available to the Board as a source of attorney fees under the 
circumstances of this case. Sanders and the Board both agree that the appropriate canon of 
construction where statutes conflict is that the later or more specific statute should control. See 
Johnson v. Boundary Sell. Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 335, 63 P.3d 457, 461 (2003); 
Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980). Plaintiff would 
have this Court conclude that 1. e. § 12-117 is both older and more specific than I. e. § 12-120(3). 
The Board contends that this is incorrect. 
It is not clear which of the two canons the Court will look at as prevailing (i.e. newer is 
more important than more specific, or vice but in this case, is deceptive. The 
it I.e. § 1 \vas vu,eVL,-,q legislature in 1970 
§ 1), I. § 1 [17 was S. ch. § 1). 
this is not a case where two statutes are created then remain unmodified for 
decades. of statutes have been amended to repeatedly (as Plaintiff 
since they were enacted. In both statutes were amended as recently as the 
session. During that session, changes to I. § I 117 became effective in 
March, 12 S.L. 2012, 149, § 1), changes to 1. § 12-120 
See Respondent's Brief, pp. II - 13. 
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effective in July, 2012 (see S.L. 2012, ch. 94).10 Where two statutes are continually reaffirmed 
by the legislature by being added to, this canon constmction less useful, as it 
becomes much more difficult to determine which statute prevails as "the more recent expression 
of legislative intent." Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 
(1980). 
Alternatively, where neither statute is clearly the later statute, the Court looks to the 
specificity of the statutes. 
10 
120 
Where there is in the same statute a specific provision and also a general one 
which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the 
fonner, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be 
taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the 
provisions of the particular provision; additional words of qualification needed to 
harmonize a general and a prior special provision in the same statute should be 
added to the general provision rather than to the special one. This general rule is 
applicable only as an aid in ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative 
intent. 
Similarly, with respect to a conflict arising between a statute dealing generally 
with a subject and another dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the 
SPecific legislation controls in a proper case. Moreover, statutes complete in 
to a specific take 
statutes that deal only 
more specific than its predecessor. 
one section deals with a subject in general terms another deals 
a same subject in a more detailed two should be 
harmonized, if possible; but if there is a conflict, the specific section control 
over the general. 
Am . .fur. § 161 (emphasis added). Based on § 1 120(3) should 
Plaintiffs (see Re:-,pondent's Briel; p. 11), the reaffirmation of and amendments to 1. C. § I 
eJlcct in July, 2012, would make it the later statute. 
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apply. It is more specific as to the types of cases to which it applies (contracts vs. general cases 
political subdi visions) and it is later in chapter. 
Sanders contends that I. § 12-117 is more specific than I. e. § 1 120(3), but provides 
little support for this contention. See Respondent's Brief, p. 13. Sanders relies on Tomich v. City 
of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400, 901 P.2d 501,507 (1995) to show that I.e. § 12-117 is more 
specific than I.e. § 12-120. Respondent's Brief, p. 13. There is no discussion of I.e. § 12-117 nor 
I.e. § 12-120 in Tomich. Tomich only holds that I.e. § 6-918A is more specific and newer than 
I.e. § 12-121. Tomich, 127 Idaho at 400, 901 P.2d at 507. Interestingly, Tomich says nothing 
about the applicability of 1. e. § 12-117, even though a city was involved as a party. I I 
Interestingly, Tomich gives insight as to what the Court looks at to determine whether a 
statute is more specific. With regard to I.e. §§ 12-121 and 6-918A, the Court stated "To the 
extent of any conflict between I.e. § 12-121 and I.C. § 6-918A, we apply I.C. § 6-918A. It is not 
only the later statute, but also a more specific statement of the legislature's intent about the award 
of attorney in tort claims cases." Tomich, 127 Idaho at 400, 901 P at 507 (emphasis 
added). 1. § 6-918A was more the type of case at 
Issue. to this case, 1. § 1 is the more because it 
transactions, as opposed to generally any case 
involving a political subdivision. As the Court has held, I. e. § 12-117 is more specific over I. e. 
§ 12-121 the later is completely general-§ 12-121 applies to every case, regardless of 
the parties . or of claims included. I. e. § 12-117 has the same standard as § 1 121, 
II If the Court adopts Plaintiffs logic that cases involving political subdivisions are limited to fees under I. C. 
§ 12-117 only, Tmnicb., like Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2008), 
wilt have to be determined to have been overruled by Brown v. City o{Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,811-12,229 
P .3d 1164, 1173-74 (2010) (which holds that 1. C. § 12-117 is exclusive as to 1. C. § 6-91 
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but applies to certain parties. I.e. § 1 120(3), on the other hand, applies to a very specific type 
casc (contracts, commercial transactions, . Tomich 'UH,UP"J that the specificity the Court 
looks at is the type of case at issue (tort claims, contract claims, etc.), as opposed to the parties 
involved. This is backed up in numerous cases where specific case-based attorney fee statutes 
apply over more general ones. See Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d 
713, 715 (Ct. App. 2008) (I. e. § 6-918A (tort cases involving governmental entities) is exclusive 
over I.e. § 12-117 (general cases involving governmental entities)); Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho 
155,267 P.3d 1270, 1276-78 (2012) (I.e. § 9-344(2) was held to be the exclusive attorney fee 
statute in a Public Records Act case, over I. e. § § 12-121 and 12-117). The Board contends that if 
the Court finds I.e. §§ 12-120 and 12-117 to have irreconcilable conflicts, because I.e. § 12-
120(3) dictates not only which parties it applies to but also what categories of claims (contract, 
commercial transaction, etc.), it should be deemed the more specific statute, and the Board 
should have been allowed to pursue fees under that statute. 
Fi11al1yT, 
to 
IS 
689 (1999) 
12-117 discussing 
, argues that the history of 1. C. § 117 demonstrates the legislature's 
Respondent's pp. 13- statement by a 
8 P.2d a statute. 
intent can be ascertained by applying of grammatical 
interpretation of the statute. There is no 
the plain language of I.e. § 12-l20(3), it 
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof." only way that Sanders' argument 
in I.e. § 
to "the state 
1. e. § 
120(3) is not applicable can correct is if Ignores plain language of 1. § 1 
120(3). This is not a reasonable canon of construction under any circumstance. See Hillside 
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Landscape Const.! Inc. v. City o(Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749, 753, 264 P.3d 388, 392 (2011). 
contention that the legislative intent the statute to exclusive is 
determined by its history (as opposed to by its language) is unsupported, and without merit, 
particularly where there is no assertion that the statute is ambiguous. 
Based on the foregoing, the Board contends that ifthere is a conflict betv/een !. e. § § 12-
120(3) and 12-117, 12-120(3) is the more specific statute, and should apply over 12-117. 
Therefore, Judge Norton abused her discretion by refusing to detennine whether attorney fees 
were awardable under that statute. 
C. BECAUSE THE BOARD AND THE DISTRICT ARE DISTINCT LEGAL 
ENTITIES,DIFFERENT FEE STATUTES MAY APPLY AND I.e. § 12-117 DOES 
NOT APPLY IN THIS SUIT AGAINST THE BOARD. 
The Board has argued in the alternative that Sanders missed the mark in arguing that I. C. 
§ 12-117 is the only applicable fee statute. The basis for this argument is that Sanders' claims for 
breach of contract are against the Board of Trustees of Mountain Home School District (as 
opposed to the itself), which Board is not an entity identified or defined within the scope 
I.e. § 1 117. statute not apply to this case. 
none 
First, as an aside, that the Board did not this argument 
below. Respondent's 14 -- i5. Such argument should not Court from 
addressing this for disregarding the Board's argument. the only 
time this Court addressing arguments made by counsel on are when such 
are made for the time in the reply brief or at oral arguments. See 141 
Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 1 (2005) ("this Court will not consider raised 
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first time in appellant's reply brief."); lvfyers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 
95 P.3d 977, (same); Robbins v. CountvotBlaine, 1 Idaho 113, 1 5,996 P.2d 81 , 
815 (2000) (issues raised for the first time at oral argument are not properly before the Court). 
The basis for this logic is that reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the 
issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an 
opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief." Suitts, 141 Idaho at 708, 117 P.3d at 122.12 In 
this case, Sanders has clearly had the opportunity to respond to the Board's argument (as it is 
contained within the Respondent's Brief), and therefore the issue is squarely before the Court. 
Second, Sanders argues that this issue is form over substance. Respondenl's Brie}; p. 15. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion is incorrect. Sanders ignores the distinction made by Idaho 
statutes differentiating between the Board as an entity (governed by Chapter 5, Title 33, rdaho 
Code) and school districts as entities (governed by Chapter 3, Title 33, Idaho Code). Sanders 
attempts to show that her employment contract was between herself and the Board of Trustees by 
citing to 127 Idaho 11 898 ( 1(95). 
's Brief, p. 15. fails to a 
this nothing as to an contract 
between a teacher and a district is "as a matter of law, between [the teacher] and 
of Trustees", as have the Court believe. Respondent's p. 15. 
12 It is clear that the Court will refuse to address new issues which have not been heard by the trial court. For 
example, a person may not raise new affirmative defense on appeal. See, e.g. :=..o~,-,,~~=--,-,-,c.:..=~~~~~~ 
Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 23 I, 245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010) (a party may not raise a due process issue before 
the appellate COUlt if that never raised the issue before the trial court); Haves~,-State, 146 [daho 357, 195 
P.3d 712, 716 (Ct. App. 2008) ([n criminal eases, issues not addressed to the trial court will not be addressed by the 
appellate court). These situations do not apply to this case, because the issue of attorney fees was squarely 
to the District Court, and this appeal is dealing with Judge Norton's denial of attorney fees to the Board under I. C § 
12-120(3). the Board may each and every reason why it considers Judge Norton's ruling to be an 
abuse of discretion. 
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lssues III Brown involved whether a particular board of trustees complied with a statute and 
an assistant superintendent had authority to enter an oral employment contract with a 
potential employee. Brown, 127 Idaho at 115 - 18. Neither of these issues resulted in a 
discussion of whether a Board of Trustees can have an employment contract with a teacher, nor 
do they relate to this case. 
Statutory law is clear on this subject. The Board of Trustees makes the decision whether 
to enter the contract. 1. C. § 33-5 I3(1). However, there must be a written employment contract in 
a fonn approved by the state superintendent o~public instruction. Id. Every written teacher's 
contract, including Sanders' contracts, contains essentially the following language: 
THIS CONTRACT, made this day of __ year of __ , by and between 
School District No. , [daho ("the 
District"), and ("the Teacher"). 
WITNESSETH: 
1. The District hereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Section 33-
l3 514(2)(a), Idaho Code, for the duration of the school year ... 
The applicable language in Sanders' employment contract states, almost identically, as fol 
WITNESSETH: 
1. The District hereby the Teacher pursuant to Idaho § 33-515 
for the the 2007/2008 school year .... 
13 This language is copied from the form teacher's contract prepared by the Idaho State Department of 
Education, with blanks intact. All teacher's contracts are available on the Idaho State Department of Education 
website. See http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/educatorresources/contracts.htm (last checked Sept. 2012). The 
Court may take judicial notiee of these as they are generally known and statutorily required within this 
Court's jurisdiction, and are of accurate and ready determination, as they are from a source (i.e. thc State 
Department of Education) whose accuracy cannot readily be questioned. See 111 Idaho 692, 700 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (overruled on other groundsL Swo~ SWOP/fl, 112 Idaho 974, 982 (1987). See also =c==-~ 
Doe, 146 Idaho 389, 195 P.3d 745, 748 eCt. App. 2008) (the court allowed judicial notice to be taken of a city 
ordinance); City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 325,420 P.2d 805,808 (1966) (acts of legislature must be 
given judicial notice, citing to l. C. § 9-101). 
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It is clear from the statute, and from the language of the contract itself, that Sanders was 
employed by the Mountain Home School District, not the Board. Though the Board may make 
employment decisions, the District is the separate and distinct entity which employs the teachers. 
Sanders also relies on Thomas v. State, 16 Idaho 81, 100 P. 761 (1909) in support of her 
argument, stating that "this Court has recognized that an action brought against a board of 
trustees of a school district is an action against the state through its political subdivision." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 15. Thomas does not say this, nor does it in any way hold that suing a 
board is the same thing as suing the entity itself. The issue in Thomas was not whether suing the 
board was the same as suing the entity, but whether suing the board was the same thing as suing 
the state, an issue which is completely irrelevant to this case. First, as the Court recognized in 
Thomas, the specific Board being sued was for the Albion State Normal School, an entity whose 
specific statutory creation made it such that a suit could be brought against the State itself when 
the Albion Board allegedly breached a contract. Thomas, 100 P. at 762 - 63. Therefore, only 
because the statutes Albion State Normal School for 
State the the school could be a suit state. 
Frankly, this wasn't even the Thomas. The essential question was 
district court jurisdiction to hear the case (as it was a case against and the Supreme 
answered as the State, at that time, must have brought in 
the Supreme Court. ld. at 762. 14 the statutes which created Albion School do not 
create other school districts in this therefore this specific mling docs not establish 
14 This determination was later overruled. See Grant Const. Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 413, 443 P.2e! 
1010 (1968). 
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all suits against school boards are suits against the State itself. 
A second issue with the Thomas case is that even if Sanders is correct that Thomas does 
apply, and this Court agrees that suing the Board is the same as suing the 15, then Judge 
Norton still improperly denied fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). By its terms, I.e. § 1 117 only 
applies to actions involving "as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a 
person." 1. e. § 12-117(1). Neither "political subdivision" nor "state agency" is defined to include 
the State ofIdaho itself. See I.e. §§ 12-1 17(5)(b) and (5)(d); I.e. § 67-5201. On the other hand, 
1. e. § 12-120(3) quite specifically includes the "the state of Idaho or political subdivision 
thereof' in the definition of a party. Therefore, utilizing Sanders' own argument, if Thomas 
stands for the proposition that a suit against a school board for breach of contract is the same as a 
suit against the state for breach of contract, then the proper attorney fee statute is 1. e. § 12-
120(3), and Judge Norton committed a breach of discretion by refusing to allow fees under the 
appropriate statute. 
Though Sanders that numerous other cases show that suits against the governing 
body of a political subdivision arc trA<lt,,·rj as if were a against 
itself, Sanders cannot one case or statute a school a schoo 1 district 
must be treated as the same for all and purposes, including attorney statutes. 
This is because there is no such case. The statutes make it clear that the two entities (the Board 
and the district) are distinct. Sanders could sued the Mountain Home School for 
breach of her employment contract16 as it was employer, but she did not do so. she 
15 Since Thomas. did not hold that suing a Board is the same thing as suing the entity itself, the only issue 
which would be relevant would be what attorney fee statutes are available if suing the Board was the same as suing 
the State itself. 
16 See I. C. § 33-301 (School districts may sue or be sued). 
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is not suing a political subdivision or state agency, and 1. e. § 12-117 does not apply. The 
applicable attorney statute is 1. e. § 1 20(3), and the Board requests that Court 
determine that Judge Norton abused her discretion in determining otherwise. 
THE BOARD DID NOT APPEAL JUDGE NORTON'S RULING THAT FEES 
WERE NOT ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE § 12-117. 
In her brief, Sanders argues that this Court should affirm the "District Court's factual 
finding that Plaintiff Sanders' case had a reasonable basis in fact and law." Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 16 17. The logic behind this argument appears to be that attorney fees can only be awarded 
under 1. e. § 12-117 if the Court is left with a belief that the "nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." I.e. § 12-117(1). However, the Board has never challenged nor 
appealed Judge Norton's determination that fees were not available under 1. e. § 12-117. See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 5 (identifying that the issues on appeal are only whether 1. e. § 12-120(3) is 
available to the Board under the circumstances of this case, and whether I.e. § 12-117 is the 
exclusive source of attorney fees where the claim at issue is a breach of employment contract 
claim). Because the has never this Court reconsider s 
decision in denying attorney f. § I 11 Sanders' request that the a 
such finding is moot. 
The Board has requested attorney fees appeal. Sanders has failed to respond to 
request in any way (except to ask for attorney herself upon appeal). Other than pointing out 
that the same counsel who worked on this present case also appeared before this 111 
Eotlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 1 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010), reh'g 
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denied (Mar. 17, 2010)17, Sanders has failed to in any way address most of the Board's 
By the same logic, Sanders' counsel was the same counsel who appeared in Willie v. 
Ed. o(Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 132,59 P.3d 302,303 (2002)18, and should be intimately aware 
of the ruling in that case (and also aware that Willie was in no way discussed in or explicitly 
overruled by Potlatch). Therefore, to the extent that Willie is still good law (it has been recently 
cited as good law and has never been explicitly overruled), Sanders has no reasonable argument 
that the Board should not be awarded fees on appeal under I.e. § 12-120(3). Further, to the 
extent that the Board is a party to this action (as opposed to the District itself), there was no 
reasonable basis in la'll to argue that it cannot obtain attorney fees tInder I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Finally, to the extent that Sanders in no way responded to the Board's request for attorney 
fees, she has waived any argument to the contrary. See Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 298, 92 
P.3d 542, 548 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or 
argument is lacking."). Therefore, the Board requests that it be granted attorney fees on appeal. 
statement of the case, 
a number of statements. Sanders makes a number contentions m her brief that are 
misleading. For example, Sanders states that no claim in the Complaint to the 
grievance process." Respondent's Brief, p. 1. While this statement is correct, it fails to 
acknowledge that even though Sanders did not include a claim in the Complaint related to 
17 See Respondent's Brief, p. 21. 
18 John Rumel argued before the Supreme Court in the Willie case. Mr. Rumel also argued Potlatch. He was 
the attorney of record in this case as well, until he substituted out and was replaced by Paul Stark in June, 20 II. R. 
Vo!. I (Register of Actions). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL - 21 
alleged deficiencies in the grievance process, the Board was still obligated to defend such 
claims. In Sanders' Motion for Summary she argued "that the Board to 
consider and resolve her grievance." R. Vol. I, p. 32. Judge Greenwood addressed this issue (and 
denied this claim), noting that the "Defendants strenuously object to injecting the issue of failure 
to follow the grievance process." R. Vol. 1, p. 32. Thus, even though Sanders failed to include in 
the Complaint a claim related to the grievance process (which grievance process included the 
non-binding arbitration), the Board was obligated to defend such a claim. See R. Vol. 1, p. 32. 
Therefore, there can hardly be an implication that the issue of the grievance process was not 
raised before the District Court. 
Next, Sanders contends that the District "claimed it was asking for only half of its 
arbitration costs." Respondent's Brief, p. 2. The record is clear that the Board only sought its 
costs from the non-binding arbitration as discretionary costs pursuant to 1.R. CP. 54. See R. Vol. 
1, pp. 63, 102. This amount was $2,304.50, which is what Judge Norton awarded as discretionary 
costs. R. Vol. 1, 143. 
it should be noted by Board, 
arbitration, was a the 
and the Mountain Home Education Association. 's Record Exhibits, 102 (p. 
15). Had the Board failed to in the non-binding arbitration, there is little doubt but that 
would have been facing an explicit claim for violation grIevance 
In seeking the arbitration costs paid by Board related to the Board 
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only sought to recoup the half of the arbitrator's total bill which the Board was responsible for 
paying and did pay. R. Vol. I, pp. (showing that the Board's total portion of the 
arbitrator's bill was $2,304.50). Sanders alleges that the District Court "found, contrary to the 
evidence, that the District had paid $4,609.00 and ordered payment of what it believed to be onc-
half of the amount paid by the District." Respondent's Brief, p. 2. This appears to be correct. The 
Order Granting Costs and Denying Attomey Fees states "The affidavit of costs reveals that the 
School District paid total arbitration costs of $4,609.00 so the court will award half of that 
amount, or $2,304.50 as discretionary costs." R. Vol. I, p. 139. In finding this, Judge Norton 
appears to have mistakenly concluded that the Board paid for the entire arbitration, and was just 
seeking to recoup half of those fees. If this is the basis for Judge Norton's finding, then the Board 
has no option but to agree that Judge Norton's ruling on this issue should be reversed and 
remanded so that the parties may correct her mistaken assumptions and allow her to again 
detennine whether the arbitration costs are discretionary costs. 
That being said, just because Judge Norton awarded the arbitration costs on a mistaken 
not mean the costs cannot as discretionary costs. 
that costs related to because must have 
dealt with as directed by the Uniform Arbitration Act. Respondent's Brief, p. 18. There 
arc two problems with this argument. first, most is that the Uniform 
Arbitration Act does not apply to this case. The act specifically states that "This act does not 
to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between respective 
representatives (unless provided in the " I.C § 1. There is little doubt 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Mountain Home School District and the 
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Mountain Home Education Association, which contains the arbitration requirements, constitutes 
an "arbitration agreement[] between and or between their respective 
representatives." See Clerk's Record Exhibits, 102 (pp. 15 - 16). There is nothing in the 
arbitration clauses in the Collective Bargaining Agreement indicating that it is to be governed by 
the Uniform Arbitration Act. !d. Therefore, all of Sander's arguments based upon the Unifonn 
Arbitration Act are without foundation. 
Second, to the extent that Sanders relies on 1. C. § 7 -91O and Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. 
Co., 128 Idaho 398, 403, 913 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996), such authority is inapposite. Even if the 
Uniform Arbitration Act were to be applied to this case, neiiher the Board nor Sanders could 
have obtained an award of costs from the arbitrator. Under the terms of the arbitration 
agreement, "The arbitrator's recommendation shall be advisory and made to the Board of 
Trustees of School District 193 and the grievant." Clerk's Record ~xhibits, 102 (p. 16) (emphasis 
added). Even if the arbitrator had awarded costs or fees, it would not have been binding. 
Therefore, the oniy way arbitration costs could be allowed in this case would be as part of the 
has, in past, affirmed a 011 different grounds 
those stated by District Judge. See Martel v. BuloUi, 138 Idaho 1, 65 P.3d 192, 194 
("This Court may uphold decisions on alternate 
of and oflaw on appeal."). The Board 
the exceptional nature of non-binding arbitration 
those stated in the findings 
and still contends, that due to 
is a possible basis for the 
to award arbitration as discretionary costs pursuant to I. R. CP. 
54( d)(1 )(D). Pursuant to that section, the costs were llv'JLv"(H arbitration was requested by 
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Sanders, and therefore the District had to comply), reasonable (the Board only seeks the amount 
it paid, which is $2,500 for a full day arbitration), exceptional (had Board not engaged 
in the non-binding arbitration, it would have been sued for violation of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement), and "should in the interest of justice be assessed against" Sanders. IR. c.P. 
54(d)(l)(D). See also R. Vol. J, pp 104 - 05, 126 - 27. Therefore, the Board requests that if this 
Court does not see fit to affinn the award of arbitration fees as discretionary costs on the grounds 
stated herein, that the Court return the issue to Judge Norton to allow for "express findings as to 
why [the] discretionary costs should or should not be allowed." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314,109 P.3d 161,168 (2005). 
To that end, there is no basis (as Sanders would have this Court conclude) to deny the 
request for discretionary costs outright. As discussed above, such award would not be barred by 
the Unifonn Arbitration Act since the arbitration agreement at issue is not covered by the act. 
Further, neither I § 12-101 nor J.R.C.P. 54(d) forbid an award of costs for a non-binding 
arbitration 
by 
(i 
J.R.CP 
proceeding" 
(such as 
the alleged 
lead to a lawsuit. 1. C § 12-101 only states that costs be awarded as allowed 
CP. 54( d) says about can or cannot costs 
at the qualities of the costs to f1Pl"PrtYl can see 
1 )(0». Further, there is no definition in I § J 101 as to what a "civil trial or 
such term(s) could easily be construed to include steps to a lawsuit 
non-binding arbitration). [t was Sanders who attempted to interject 
of the grievance procedure the lawsuit though no such claim 
was contained in the Complaint). See R. I, p. 32. Sanders should not able to 
attempt to the costs that resulted from her actions. 
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Plaintiff Sanders contends that she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I. § 
117. Respondent's Brief, p. 21. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, under the plain 
language of I.e. § 12-117, attorney fees are only allowed to the prevailing party. I.e. § 12-
117(1). Plaintiff Sanders in no way can be considered the prevailing party, as judgment was 
entered on behalf of the Board, and Plaintiff Sanders has obtained no relief which she has sought. 
Second, under I. e. § 12-117 attorney fees may only be awarded if the Court "finds that 
h '1' rl . h 1 1 1 • • -C' "'- - 1 _ "r f'f n -'( "" -'( -1 ?"1/ -'(" rr>h tHe nonpreVallmg party actcu WIt! out a feasonaDle DaSIS In mel or law. 1.C. 9 1L-11 !~l). 1 e 
Board contends that there is significant basis for its arguments. Though (as Sanders points out 
repeatedly) there are numerous cases holding that I. e. § 12-117 is exclusive to those entities to 
which it applies, none of those cases specifically holds that I. e. § 12-117 is exclusive over 1. e. § 
120. There are at least five case allowing attorney fees in contract cases to governmental 
entities under 1. § 1 120(3).19 At least two of these cases have been decided in the iast twelve 
supra. addition, various political have had other 
==~""-'-"~==.~-=-'-:'~~~= 147 Idaho 852,216 P.3d 141 (2009) (allowing attorney to 
City under 1. § 1 120(1)). 
Based on apparent conflict, there is sufficient basis for the Board to argue that it is 
entitled to attorney fees under e. § 12-120 to prevent the conclusion that the Board's argument 
is "without a reasonable basis in fact or " City of Osburn v. Randel, 1 Idaho 906, 910, 277 
19 See Clark;, Huvett, Sadid, and supra. 
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PJd 353, 357 (2012). Therefore, the Board contends that Sanders has not adequately shown that 
the Board's for fees pursuant to I. e. § 12-1 is unreasonable or foundation, 
and Sanders should not be granted attorney fees on appeal. 
Based on the foregoing, the Board requests that this Court reverse Judge Norton's 
decision to disallow fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). Also, as there has been no objection to the 
reasonableness of the requested fees, the Board also requests that this Court allow fees in the 
requested amount, and also allow reasonable attorney fees on appeal. Finally, the Board agrees 
'with Sanders' contention that Judge Norton awarded arbitration costs as discretionary costs on a 
mistaken premise, and requests that this Court return the issue to Judge Norton to detennine 
whether such costs are available under the facts of this case. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this day of October, 2012. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & LLP 
Brian 
Attorneys for 
Respondent 
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